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by Paul Caster and Carl A. Scheraga
Airlines,	 as	 part	 of	 their	 strategic	 planning	 process,	 articulate	 positions	 with	 regard	 to	 cost	
leadership,	 product	 differentiation,	 and	 growth.	 Decisions	 implemented	 are	 dynamic	 and	 inter-
temporal	in	nature.	Therefore,	it	is	often	difficult	to	assess	the	effectiveness	of	changes	in	strategies,	
particularly	since	such	effectiveness	is	often	a	function	of	the	confounding	forces	of	organizational	
strategy	and	market	conditions.	Managers	thus	need	a	multi-period	methodology	to	evaluate	the	
implementation	 of	 strategic	 positions.	 One	 such	 approach	 is	 the	 strategic	 variance	 analysis	 of	
operating	income.	
Horngren	et	al.	(2000,	2006,	2012)	demonstrate	a	methodological	template	for	decomposing	
operating	income	into	three	components:	(1)	growth,	(2)	price	recovery,	and	(3)	productivity.	It	is	
suggested	that	the	price	recovery	component	assesses	a	firm’s	product	differentiation	strategy	and	
that	 the	productivity	component	assesses	a	firm’s	 low-cost	strategy.	Thus,	 this	 framework	is	very	
much	in	the	spirit	of	Porter’s	(1980)	seminal	work.
This	study	examines	U.S.	network	airlines	 in	 the	post-9/11	environment.	Utilizing	 the	above	
methodology,	it	first	identifies	comparative	strategic	positions	across	airlines	and	then	assesses	the	
implementation	efficacy	of	these	positions.
INTRODUCTION
The decade from 2000-2010 was a tumultuous one for the U.S. airlines industry. This has been 
particularly so for network carriers (as classified by the U.S. Department of Transportation) Alaska, 
American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways. Since the upheaval of 9/11, 
United, Delta, US Airways (twice), and Northwest have all filed for bankruptcy. American and 
Continental reorganized outside of bankruptcy. Not including regional affiliates, these airlines 
account for a 58% share of the U.S. market (Herbst 2009).
In comparing 2008 with 2000, Herbst (2009) details some dramatic statistics for the so-
called legacy carriers—American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways.1 Total 
operating revenue decreased by $2.3 billion, falling from $89.2 billion to $86.9 billion. Fuel cost 
went from $11.3 billion to $36 billion (an increase of 218%). More specifically, the fuel cost for the 
average one-way passenger fare increased by 304%, going from $23 to $93. Capacity as measured 
by available seat miles (ASMs) decreased by 14.3%. At the same time, employee wage/salary 
expense decreased by 33.5%. The average one-way passenger fare increased by 22%, going from 
$162 to $198. While the average air fare increased by $36, the labor wage cost for the average air 
fare decreased by 36% to $41. Since 9/11, over 155,000 jobs for just the legacy carriers have been 
lost, falling from 428,000 to 272,000 (a decrease of 36%) total employees. The average passenger 
ratio to airline employee increased from 1,139 passengers per employee to 1,413. As employees 
worked more for less, the average revenue generated per employee increased by 53%, going from 
$209,000 per employee to over $319,000. 
Data from the Security and Exchange Commission (10K Reports) and the Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics show a similar pattern for Alaska Airlines for this time period. While 
operating revenues increased 83%, operating income declined by 82%. Average fuel cost increased 
by 232%, although available seat miles increased by 25%. The average passenger fare increased by 
34%. From 2002 to 2008, the average number of passengers per employee increased from 1,396 to 
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1,746, the average revenue per employee increased by 63%, the number of employees decreased by 
5%, and wages and benefits as a percentage of operating income decreased by 5.9%.
This study utilizes strategic variance analysis to investigate how changes in network airlines’ 
strategies, in the post-9/11 environment, have impacted operating income. The analysis will not 
only allow for the examination of the impact of a carrier’s strategic actions with regard to managing 
growth, price-recovery, productivity, and capacity, but will also allow for a benchmarking of the 
efficacy of a carrier’s strategies against those of its rivals. As noted below, this kind of analysis 
is particularly useful in a dynamic environment such as that faced by the network carriers, where 
strategic actions by rivals are simultaneous and interactive (Mudde and Sopariwala 2008b).
Several recent articles have applied strategic variance analysis to analyze a given airline’s 
profitability (Mudde and Sopariwala 2008a and Bailey et al. 2009) or to examine a given airline’s 
cost structure (Dikolli and Sedatole 2004). However, none of these articles provides a comprehensive 
and strategic analysis of airline profitability by comparing each carrier to similar airlines in their 
sector of the industry, nor has any study been conducted over an extended period of time.
STRATEGIC VARIANCE ANALYSIS
In his seminal work, Michael Porter (1980) developed the paradigm of three generic strategies for 
creating a competitive advantage.  A firm pursuing a position of cost leadership will emphasize 
efficiency in order to lower costs, thus being able to under-price competitors.  The focus of such 
a strategy is one of low margins and high volume. A firm with a strategic orientation toward 
differentiation seeks to produce a product or service that embodies distinctive qualities for which 
customers are willing to pay a premium price. The third strategy is a niche-seeking one.  This 
strategy seeks to identify a small part of the market not served by direct competitors of the firm. 
The firm is able to charge a premium price for a high quality product desired by this small market 
segment, that is, volume of sales will be low but margins high.
Banker and Johnston (2002) argue that in increasingly dynamic business environments, in 
the context of Porter’s strategy framework, “it has become increasingly important for managers to 
develop coherent, internally and logically consistent business strategies and to have tools and models 
which provide useful information to support strategic decision-making, planning and control.” One 
development, in response to this strategic mandate, has been the emergence of strategic variance 
analysis (SVA). Shank and Churchill (1977) note that variance analysis is the term applied to the 
process of specifying the reasons as to why actual operating income, for a given period, is different 
from the expected or planned level of operating income. Operating income is decomposed into 
components (and their associated measures) that logically relate to a firm’s business strategy as 
described by Porter above. The variances are differences in the component measures of budgeted 
versus actual operating income.
Specifically, Shank, and Govindarajan (1993) decompose variances in operating revenues into 
mutually exclusive sub-variances in order to separate out the impacts of key underlying causal 
factors. They define the notion of corporate mission in terms of profitability and the orientation/
perspective of build, hold, or harvest. They further define the notion of strategy in terms of Porter’s 
low cost leadership and product differentiation.  They then argue that by analyzing the sub-variances 
with reference to a firm’s mission and strategy, one can determine the extent to which variances 
between actual and budgeted performance are consistent, or not consistent, with the above mission 
and strategy. Furthermore, these variances can suggest the dimensions of performance that need 
improvement. The framework of Horngren et al. (2012) provides the specification of the components 
of operating revenues utilized in this study. 
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THE FRAMEWORK OF THIS STUDY
Horngren et al. (2000, 2006, 2012) provide a framework for analyzing a manufacturer’s change in 
operating income from one period to any future period by decomposing company performance into 
cost leadership, product differentiation, and growth components. Sopariwala (2003) extends the 
SVA model in Horngren et al. (2000) to include underutilization of capacity as a fourth factor in 
the analysis. Capacity utilization is an important consideration, particularly in the airline industry, 
where carriers make strategic decisions about grounding existing airplanes or purchasing new 
airplanes and expanding their fleets. Mudde and Sopariwala (2008b) adapt the Horngren et al. 
(2000) framework to include factors unique to the airline industry. They also choose cost drivers, 
such as RPMs and ASMs, that are more suitable to airlines as compared with those that would be 
used by manufacturers. The individual components described in Mudde and Sopariwala (2008b) are 
as follows:
Growth Components
The growth component for an airline measures the change in operating income caused by variations 
in revenue-passenger miles (RPMs) (holding sales prices, input costs, and input-output relationships 
constant) that are due to either changes in market share or in market size.
Price-Recovery Component
The price-recovery component measures the change in operating income caused by variations in 
sales prices and unit input costs (holding sales units, for example RPMs or ASMs, and input-output 
relationships constant). Horngren et al. (2012) suggest that the price-recovery component assesses 
a firm’s product	differentiation	strategy. A positive value for this component implies that the firm’s 
product differentiation strategy provided sufficient pricing power to the firm so that its customers 
were induced to reimburse the firm by an amount greater than the increase in costs experienced by 
the firm.
Productivity Component
The productivity component measures the change in operating income caused by variations in input-
output relationships (holding RPMs, sales prices, and unit input costs constant). Horngren et al. 
(2012) suggest that this component assesses a firm’s low-cost	 strategy. A positive value for this 
component implies that operating income increased because of gains in the firm’s efficiency.
Capacity Underutilization Component
The capacity underutilization component measures the change in operating income caused by a 
variation in the cost of unused capacity over the time period being considered. Sopariwala (2003) 
suggests that this component assesses a firm’s ability to manage the critical tradeoff between used 
and unused capacity.
The empirical specifications of each of these components are provided in the appendix. The 
specifications utilized are those provided in Mudde and Sopariwala (2008b), who show the variances 
were normalized by dividing by revenue-passenger miles in billions.
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PURVIEW OF THIS STUDY
Mudde and Sopariwala (2008b) performed an SVA on Southwest Airlines for the year 2005 relative 
to 2004. They showed that the $266.5 million increase in operating income in 2005 was primarily 
the result of Southwest’s productivity gains during the period. Southwest has a reputation in the 
industry as a cost leader, and during the period, they reduced fuel usage costs, decreased costs due to 
increases in passenger load factor, and decreased costs due to increases in miles flown per passenger, 
all consistent with their strategy as a low cost leader.
Mudde and Sopariwala (2008a) used this SVA of Southwest Airlines for the year 2005 as a 
benchmark for United Airlines for the same year. Their analysis illustrated that an SVA of a single 
company, taken by itself, may produce misleading results. For example, when examining the growth 
component, United Airlines appeared to be doing better in 2005 due to an increase in the size of 
the market. But that increase was negligible when compared with Southwest. However, it is not 
obvious that Southwest Airlines is an appropriate benchmark for United Airlines (see Tsoukalas et 
al. 2008). In an unpublished working paper, Mudde and Sopariwala (2010) use industry averages 
taken from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics to benchmark 
the performance of American Airlines for the year 2009. We believe this may be an improvement 
over benchmarking against a single competitor. However, we question the choice of the entire U.S. 
airline industry as an appropriate benchmark. We suggest that, for the present study, a composite 
based on using just the U.S. network airlines would make a more appropriate benchmark.
TIMEFRAME OF THIS STUDY AND ASSOCIATED DATA SET
The data needed to calculate the variances for SVA are collected from the International Civil 
Aviation Organization, Financial	Data:	Commercial	Air	Carriers,	Series	F	and Traffic:	Commercial	
Air	Carriers,	Series	T, as well as the U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics, TranStats	Aviation	Database	for the relevant years.
We examine two, three-year time periods: 2004 to 2006 and 2007 to 2009. A three-year window 
is utilized because of the need to allow time for changes in strategic choices to impact logistical, 
technological, and capacity configurations that impact operational efficiency.  Precedence for 
measuring the impact of such strategic choices from one end point of a multi-year period to the 
other can be found in Greer (2006) and Scheraga (2011). We chose 2004 as the starting point of the 
analysis because the airline industry was severely disrupted in the aftermath of 9/11 and the industry 
did not return to pre-9/11 levels until July 2004 (Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2005).
The analysis for the time period 2004-2006 included all seven of the network airlines—Alaska, 
American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways. However, US Airways was not 
included in the latter time period. US Airways and America West merged in September of 2005 
(although actual integration was not implemented until 2007), with unconsolidated financial and 
operating data for these two airlines not being available after 2007. For purposes of benchmarking, 
we constructed a composite in each time period from all the airlines being examined in that particular 
time period.
The data set includes both U.S. and international flights of each airline. The data set excludes 
flights of regional airlines that may have partnerships with network airlines. Regional airlines have 
a different profile and would not be comparable to network airlines.
RESULTS OF THE STRATEGIC VARIANCE ANALYSIS
First we illustrate the calculation of SVA using data for Delta Airlines. As shown in Table 1, Delta 
Airlines had a $1.157 billion operating loss in 2003, but three full years later, by the end of 2006, it 
recorded a $30.84 million operating profit. Thus, for the three-year period ending in 2006, operating 
profitability increased by $1.188 billion. In 2009, Delta was back in the red with a $604.8 million 
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operating loss. Thus, for the three-year period ending in 2009, operating profits decreased by $635.6 
million. Examining individual lines in the income statements is not very meaningful to gauge what 
happened during these two, three-year periods, or which aspects of Delta’s strategies were more or 
less successful.
Table 1: Example: Delta Airlines – Financial Data ($)
2003 2006 2009
Operating Revenues 14,203,030,000 17,339,136,000 18,046,578,000
Operating Expenses 15,360,195,000 17,308,296,000 18,651,424,000
Flying Operations 4,328,788,000 5,642,667,000 6,130,117,000
Maintenance 1,168,779,000 1,133,176,000 1,294,256,000
Depreciation and amortization 1,099,559,000 1,194,253,000 961,664,000
User charges 302,370,000 319,343,000 413,798,000
Station expenses 2,103,243,000 1,786,841,000 1,815,537,000
Aircraft and traffic servicing 2,405,613,000 2,106,184,000 2,229,335,000
Passenger services 1,416,162,000 1,114,511,000 1,313,133,000
Promotion and sales 1,219,397,000 1,190,751,000 1,174,798,000
General & Administrative 953,176,000 925,343,000 1,112,997,000
Transport related expenses 2,768,721,000 4,001,411,000 4,435,124,000
Operating profit -1,157,165,000 30,840,000 -604,846,000
Data Source: International Civil Aviation Organization, Financial	Data:	Commercial	Air	Carriers	Series	F, 
Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2003, 2006, and 2009
Table 2 provides the operational data for Delta Airlines needed to perform the SVA, and Table 
3 provides the fuel data. Table 4 reclassifies the financial data into the categories used by Mudde 
and Sopariwala (2008a, 2008b), namely fuel costs, flight-related costs, and passenger-related 
costs. Flight-related costs include flying operations less fuel costs, plus maintenance, passenger 
service, general and administrative costs, depreciation and amortization, and transport-related 
costs. Passenger-related costs include aircraft and traffic servicing expenses and promotion and 
sales-related expenses. Finally, Table 5 calculates the data used to perform the SVA based on the 
reclassified financial data in Table 4 combined with the operational data in Table 2 and the fuel 
data in Table 3. Finally, variances are calculated using the formulas in Appendix A and the data are 
normalized based on revenue-passenger-miles (RPMs) in billions. This results in the SVA presented 
in Tables 6a and 6b, in addition to the other network air carriers in this study.
Table 2: Example: Delta Airlines – Operational Data
2003 2006 2009
Revenue passenger enplanements 84,076,432 73,524,956 67,744,784
Revenue passenger miles 89,135,332,782 98,748,194,606 100,582,412,275
Available seat miles 119,886,312,311 125,073,038,393 122,149,414,544
Data Source: International Civil Aviation Organization, Traffic:	Commercial	Air	Carriers,	Series	T, 
Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2003, 2006, and 2009
Strategic Variance Analysis
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Table 3: Example: Delta Airlines – Fuel Data
2003 2006 2009
Total gallons used 2,009,322,668 1,932,690,482 1,934,723,833
Total fuel costs 1,594,053,782 4,069,259,987 4,663,250,851
Average fuel cost per gallon ($) 0.79 2.11 2.41
Data Source: U. S. Department of Transportation, Research and Innovative Administration, 
Bureau of Transportation Statistics, TranStats	Database, Washington, D. C., 2003, 2006, and 2009
Table 4: Example: Delta Airlines – Reclassified Financial Data ($)
2003 2006 2009
Total operating revenues 14,203,030,000 17,339,136,000 18,046,578,000
Less: Total operating expenses 15,360,195,000 17,308,296,000 18,651,424,000
Fuel costs 1,594,053,782 4,069,259,987 4,663,250,851
Flight-related costs 10,141,131,218 9,942,101,013 10,584,040,149
Passenger-related costs 3,625,010,000 3,296,935,000 3,404,133,000
Operating income/(loss) -1,157,165,000 30,840,000 -6,0484,6000
2003 2006 2009
Flying operations 4,328,788,000 5,642,667,000 6,130,117,000
Less: Fuel cost 1,594,053,782 4,069,259,987 4,663,250,851
Flying operations (excluding fuel cost) 2,734,734,218 1,573,407,013 1,466,866,149
Maintenance 1,168,779,000 1,133,176,000 1,294,256,000
Passenger service 1,416,162,000 1,114,511,000 1,313,133,000
General and administrative 953,176,000 925,343,000 1,112,997,000
Depreciation and amortization 1,099,559,000 1,194,253,000 96,1664,000
Transport related 2,768,721,000 4,001,411,000 4,435,124,000
Total flight-related costs 10,141,131,218 9,942,101,013 10,584,040,149
2003 2006 2009
Aircraft and traffic servicing 2,405,613,000 2,106,184,000 2,229,335,000
Promotion and sales 1,219,397,000 1,190,751,000 1,174,798,000
Total passenger-related costs 3,625,010,000 3,296,935,000 3,404,133,000
Data Sources: 1) Data Source: International Civil Aviation Organization, Financial	Data:	Commercial	Air	
Carriers,	Series	F, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2003, 2006, and 2009 and 2) U. S. Department of Transportation, 
Research and Innovative Administration, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, TranStats	Database, Washington, 
D. C., 2003, 2006, and 2009.
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The SVA of Delta clearly shows how Delta achieved profitability by the end of 2006. During the 
three-year period, productivity improvements resulted in almost $1.5 billion in increased operating 
profits. Cost cutting occurred across the board, but particularly in passenger-related activities. 
Delta’s annual reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reveal some 
specific examples of cost-cutting measures taken. Delta eliminated approximately 6,000 non-pilot 
jobs, reduced pay and benefits for non-pilot employees, and simplified the fleet by retiring four 
different fleet types. Additionally, it redesigned hubs in Atlanta and elsewhere to improve reliability 
and thereby reduce costs (SEC 2004, 2005).  
The price-recovery component indicates an almost $1 billion decrease in profitability. The 
analysis indicates that increases in Delta’s airfares were not sufficient to cover increased fuel costs 
during the period. Management of capacity resulted in approximately $510 million in increased 
profitability for the three-year period. The Delta Annual Report indicated that existing capacity was 
shifted in part from certain underperforming domestic flights to more profitable international flights 
(SEC 2006). The growth component indicates a modest $154 million improvement.
For the three years ending in 2009, the SVA of Delta shows a similar pattern to the earlier period, 
except that productivity gains were far smaller and not nearly sufficient to cover tremendous losses 
in the price-recovery component. The price-recovery component shows a loss of over $1.3 billion. 
The small increase in airfares was overwhelmed by large increases in fuel costs, flight-related costs, 
and passenger-related costs, holding all else equal. Productivity gains were more modest than in 
the prior three-year period. Delta achieved savings of $359 million in passenger-related costs and 
almost $200 million in fuel used per available seat mile. Capacity management contributed $222.3 
million in profitability and the growth component shows an increase of $39.3 million. Nonetheless, 
the large loss in the price-recovery component resulted in an overall decrease in profitability of 
$635.7 million for the three years.
The SVA for Delta is insightful and interesting, but it is an incomplete analysis without taking 
into consideration what was happening with its closest competitors. For this reason, we conduct 
a relative SVA by ranking each of the network carriers on the four components of SVA. Table 7a 
shows the rankings for the three-year period ending in 2006, after normalizing the data using RPMs 
in billions. The domestic airline business finally reached pre-9/11 levels in July 2004, and continued 
to grow during this period. Thus, six of the seven network airlines saw positive contributions to 
operating income based on growth of the business, but Continental and Alaska led the way by far, 
while Northwest and United were laggards. US Airways actually experienced a decline during this 
time period.
The price-recovery component indicates the extent an airline increases its fares relative to 
related increases in costs, holding all else equal. It is an indicator of product differentiation. As seen 
in Table 7a, US Airways experienced very positive contributions to profitability, followed by United 
and Northwest, while all other airlines were unable to raise fares in an amount sufficient to cover 
increased costs. Alaska ranked last in this category during this period, followed by Delta.
The productivity component was positive for all seven carriers. Delta led the way in this 
category, followed by Alaska, with Northwest and United ranking sixth and seventh respectively. 
Examining the price-recovery and productivity components together suggests that Northwest and 
United followed a product differentiation strategy while Delta and Alaska led the way in cost 
cutting to improve productivity. Finally, US Airways ranked first in improved profitability through 
management of capacity, and all but Continental showed increased profitability related to capacity 
changes.
Table 7b shows the rankings (now with US Airways excluded) for the three-year period ending 
in 2009, after normalizing the data using RPMs in billions. The growth component rankings are 
similar during this period. Continental again ranked first of the six airlines while Alaska slipped 
to third place from second in the earlier period. Northwest and United were at the bottom, though 
in reverse order from the earlier period. But notably, changes in the overall market resulted in 
decreases in profitability for Northwest, United, and also American.
Strategic Variance Analysis
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Table 5: Example: Delta Airlines – Data Used in Strategic Variance Analysis
2003 2006 2009
Total operating revenues ($) 14,203,030,000 17,339,136,000 18,046,578,000
Revenue passenger miles (RPMs) 89,135,332,782 98,748,194,606 100,582,412,275
Average revenue per RPM 0.159 0.176 0.179
Revenue passenger miles (RPMs) 89,135,332,782 98,748,194,606 100,582,412,275
Available seat miles (ASMs) 119,886,312,311 125,073,038,393 122,149,414,544
Passenger load factor (%) 74.35% 78.95% 82.34%
Hence, budgeted available seat miles 121,619,209,417 132,815,534,864 127,396,232,026
Revenue passenger miles (RPMs) 89,135,332,782 98,748,194,606 100,582,412,275
Revenue passenger enplanements 84,076,432 73,524,956 67,744,784
Average revenue passenger miles per 
passenger ($)
1060.17 1343.06 1484.73
Hence, budgeted revenue passenger 
enplanements 87,386,930 93,143,713 74,890,660
Number of gallons used 2,009,322,668 1,932,690,482 1,934,723,833
Available seat miles (ASMs) 119,886,312,311 125,073,038,393 122,149,414,544
Average number of gallons per ASM 0.0167602 0.0154525 0.0158390
Total flight-related costs ($) 10,141,131,218 9,942,101,013 10,584,040,149
Available seat miles (ASMs) 119,886,312,311 125,073,038,393 122,149,414,544
Average flight-related cost per ASM ($) 0.085 0.079 0.087
Total passenger-related costs ($) 3,625,010,000 3,296,935,000 3,404,133,000
Revenue passenger enplanements 84,076,432 73,524,956 67,744,784
Average cost per revenue passenger ($) 43.12 44.84 50.25
Revenue passenger (RPMs) 89,135,332,782 98,748,194,606 100,582,412,275
Available seat miles (ASMs) 119,886,312,311 125,073,038,393 122,149,414,544
Idle or unused capacity (ASMs) 30,750,979,530 26,324,843,787 21,567,002,269
Hence, budgeted idle capacity (ASMs) 32,483,876,636 34,067,340,258 26,813,819,751
Data Sources: 1) International Civil Aviation Organization, Financial	Data:	Commercial	Air	Carriers,	Series	
F, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2003, 2006, and 2009, 2) International Civil Aviation Organization, Traffic:	
Commercial	Air	Carriers,	Series	T, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2003, 2006, and 2009, and 3) U.S. Department 
of Transportation, Research and Innovative Administration, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, TranStats	
Database, Washington, D.C., 2003, 2006, and 2009.
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The price-recovery component indicates a dramatic change in the rankings for Alaska, going 
from last to first, while United maintained its second place ranking. Alaska was also the only airline 
of the six to increase fares in sufficient amount to cover related increases in costs. American and 
Continental, which were fourth and fifth respectively in the earlier period, slipped to fifth and sixth 
during the latter period.
Alaska ranked first in productivity for the three years ending 2009, while Delta slipped from first 
to fourth place. The results for Alaska are impressive, as it not only ranked first in price-recovery, 
but also first in productivity. Alaska was successful in cutting costs and also in raising fares rather 
than passing along the cost savings to its customers. American slipped to last place in productivity, 
but all six airlines experienced increases in profitability through productivity gains.
Delta, United, and Continental improved profitability through capacity management, while 
American, Alaska, and Northwest saw profitability decreases during the period related to capacity 
management.
STAGE LENGTH, DOMESTIC VERSUS FOREIGN OPERATIONS, 
AND SVA RANKINGS
Stage or average flight length is a concept that captures economies of distance.  It has been suggested 
that there is a correlation between average flight length and unit cost.  This occurs because for a 
given aircraft size, increasing the distance of a flight results in larger output volume as measured 
in RPMs.  However, it must be noted that, empirically, this posited effect has been shown to be 
ambiguous (Caves et al. 1981 and Tretheway 1984). 
The ratio of domestic scheduled revenue passenger-miles to international schedule passenger-
miles captures the international focus of an airline. A priori, the impact of this measure is not 
unambiguous, although there are arguments to suggest a potential negative influence on operational 
efficiency.  Fethi et al. (2002) suggest that an increase in the international focus of an airline 
exposes it to spatial disparities in its operating environment. In structuring bilateral agreements, the 
international air transport system has tended to focus on individual or small sets of routes between 
countries.  This has impeded the achievement of high levels of efficiency over global networks of 
air services. There are unresolved issues with regard to ownership and control, cabotage and the 
right of establishment (the setting up and management of companies).  There is still divergence 
across geographic regions with regard to competition law and policy in air transport.  There are 
differences in fiscal policies with air transport being subjected to many taxes, which is finance 
general governmental expenditure, while customs clearance can impede both speed and reliability. 
Finally, airport infrastructure constraints can significantly affect the level of competition in particular 
markets.
Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated between an airlines’ ranking on each component 
of the SVA analysis and their corresponding rankings for stage length and the ratio of domestic 
scheduled revenue passenger-miles to foreign scheduled revenue passenger-miles. There were no 
statistically significant correlations for either the 2004-2006 time period or the 2007-2009 time 
period. 
FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE GROWTH COMPONENT AND CONCLUSIONS
The domestic airline industry was rocked by the 9/11 tragedy and in the years following 9/11. This 
was coupled with a general economic downturn that lasted approximately three years.  As traffic 
increased to pre-9/11 levels, the industry began to experience tremendous increases in fuel costs that 
threatened the very existence of many airlines. The industry was again severely hit, beginning in 
mid-2008, by the worst economic recession since the 1930s.  Particularly hard hit were the legacy 
or network carriers. Management of these airlines was tasked with developing strategies to deal with 
dramatic changes in growth and the cost of inputs.
Strategic Variance Analysis
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Horngren et al.’s (2012) SVA analysis provides a useful technique to understand how management 
of these airlines developed strategies to deal with these challenges. In terms of productivity, during 
the three-year period from 2004 to 2006, all seven airlines were successful in cutting costs, with 
Delta and Alaska leading the way. This trend continued in the three-year period from 2007 to 2009, 
with Alaska and Northwest leading the way. In terms of price recovery, management of US Airways, 
United, and Northwest were successful in differentiating their service, as they were the only airlines 
able to raise fares in amounts sufficient to cover increased costs in the earlier period. Alaska showed 
dramatic improvement in raising fares during the latter period in an amount sufficient to cover 
increased costs.
Horngren et al. (2012) suggest that some changes in profitability may be exogenous to a 
company, such as an overall improvement in the economy. Other changes may be endogenous, 
such as improvements that result from management’s strategic decisions to increase productivity or 
raise selling prices. They also explain that companies that successfully implement a cost leadership 
strategy will generally exhibit favorable growth and favorable productivity. In contrast, companies 
that successfully implement a product differentiation strategy will generally exhibit favorable growth 
and favorable price-recovery. Implicit is an assumption that management will choose exclusively 
either a productivity-based strategy or a product differentiation strategy.
We believe the assumption of one exclusive strategy is too strong, and that management may 
choose a blended strategy. For example, even though management may decide upon a strategy 
of product differentiation, which often means they can successfully raise selling prices, it doesn’t 
preclude them from also trying to increase productivity. In terms of the SVA, the importance of this 
relates to adjustments made to the variances calculated to take into consideration industry-wide or 
exogenous factors. Horngren et al. (2012) assume, a priori, a cost leadership strategy when they 
illustrate SVA. Thus, they make market adjustments to the growth component and the productivity 
component. Since we do not know, a priori, management’s choice of strategy, and since management 
may follow a blended strategy at that, we only adjust the growth component for industry-wide 
factors.
In Tables 8a and 8b, we calculate the percentage change in RPMs for each network carrier. We 
also calculate a composite change for the network carriers in total. Table 8a is for the three-year 
period ending in 2006, and Table 8b is for the three-year period ending in 2009. Using Delta Airlines 
as an example, in the three-year period ending in 2006, Delta’s RPMs increased by 10.60%. Taken 
by itself, this appears to be impressive growth. However, the composite for the network carriers 
grew by 13.63%. If one assumes that Delta should have met the composite growth rate, then the net 
effect on Delta’s income for the period would be approximately $198 million.  However, as shown 
in Table 6a, the net effect of growth on income for Delta was only approximately $154 million. 
Therefore, adjusting for the market impact, Delta actually fell short by approximately $44 million, 
in terms of the growth component.
The market adjustment to the growth component is also very revealing in the three-year 
period ending in 2009. Table 6b shows that Delta experienced a modest increase in net income 
of approximately $39 million due to growth. However, Table 8b shows that the composite for the 
network carriers was a decrease in RPMs of 7.64%. Delta’s increase in RPMs during this period was 
1.84%. Compared with all network carriers, this represents a 515% improvement in performance. 
If one assumes that Delta should have equaled the composite decrease in growth, then the net 
effect on Delta’s income for the period would be a loss of approximately $163 million. Since Delta 
in fact produced an increase in income due to growth of approximately $39 million, it is as if it 
overcame a loss of $163 million to do so. Viewed in that perspective, it is equivalent to an increase 
of approximately $202 million ($39 million minus a loss of $163 million).  
SVA is a useful management tool for analyzing strategies used to improve profitability. In the 
airline industry, many strategic decisions are made that, when implemented, may take several years 
to reach their full effect on company profits. This includes long-term fuel hedges and changes in 
capacity (adding planes, deleting routes, and reconfiguring seating). This paper illustrates that SVA 
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may be performed for longer-term time frames to analyze strategic decisions. Further, the analysis 
shows the benefits of benchmarking performance against a peer group of companies, in this case the 
U.S. network airlines. The analysis indicated that Alaska Airlines in particular made great strides 
in improving profitability by not only cutting costs to improve productivity, but also increasing 
fares sufficiently to more than cover increases in fuel costs, which had risen dramatically during the 
period.
Table 8a: Impact of Endogenous Strategies - Growth Component, 2004-2006
RPMs 2004 RPMs 2006 %Δ2004-2006 ENDOGENOUS
Alaska 14,553,539,641 17,822,404,781 22.46 39.31%
American 120,299,948,302 139,420,782,629 15.89 14.22%
Continental 57,577,384,885 76,302,518,293 32.52 58.09%
Delta 89,412,207,707 98,887,497,017 10.60 -28.58%
Northwest 68,746,644,596 72,674,331,902 5.71 -138.70%
United 104,371,719,160 117,445,990,416 12.53 -8.78%
US Airways 37,774,319,226 37,357,913,286 -1.10 -1339.09%
Composite 492,735,763,516 559,911,438,325 13.63
Endogenous Effect = [%ΔRPMs(2004-2006)
Airline i
 - %ΔRPMs(2004-2006)
Market
] / |%ΔRPMs(2004-2006)
Airline i
|
Table 8b: Impact of Endogenous Strategies - Growth Component, 2007-2009
RPMs 2007 RPMs 2009 %Δ2007-2009 ENDOGENOUS
Alaska 17,822,404,781 18,361,670,904 3.03 352.15%
American 139,420,782,629 122,391,483,735 -12.21 -37.43%
Continental 76,302,518,293 77,768,332,936 1.92 497.92%
Delta 98,887,497,017 100,711,842,838 1.84 515.22%
Northwest 72,674,331,902 62,941,173,546 -13.39 -42.94%
United 117,445,990,416 100,453,973,793 -14.47 -47.23%
Composite 522,553,525,039 482,628,477,752 -7.64
Endogenous Effect = [%ΔRPMs(2007-2009)
Airline i
 - %ΔRPMs(2007-2009)
Market
] / |%ΔRPMs(2007-2009)
Airline i
|
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APPENDIx – Calculation of Strategic Variances from Year i to Year j
The Growth Component
1.  Airline Revenues
[Revenue effect of the Growth Component (i.e., lower expected revenue due to lower RPM)]
Variance = {Year i revenue/RPM} * {Year j RPMs – Year i RPMs}
2. Fuel Costs
[Fuel cost effect of the Growth Component (i.e., lower expected fuel costs due to lower 
RPMs)]
Variance = {Year i fuel cost/gallon} * {Year i gallons used per ASM} * {Year i actual ASMs – 
Year j budgeted ASMs}
3. Flight-related Costs
[Flight-related cost effect of the Growth Component (i.e., lower expected flight-related costs 
due to lower RPMs)]
Variance = {Year i cost/ASM} * {Year i passenger load factor} * {Year i actual ASMs – Year j 
budgeted ASMs}
4. Passenger-related Costs
[Passenger-related cost effect of the Growth Component (i.e., lower expected passenger-
related costs due to lower RPMs)]
Variance = {Year i cost/passenger} * {Year i revenue passengers – Year j budgeted revenue 
passengers} 
The Price-Recovery Component
1.  Airline Revenues
[Revenue effect of the Price-Recovery Component (i.e., higher revenue due to higher 
airfares)]
Variance = {Year j RPMs} * {Year j revenue/RPM – Year i revenue/RPM}
2.  Fuel Costs
[Fuel cost effect of the Price-Recovery Component (i.e., higher costs due to higher fuel 
prices)]
Variance = {Year j budgeted ASMs} * {Year i gallons used/ASM} * {Year i fuel cost/gallon – 
Year j fuel cost/gallon}
3.  Flight-related Costs
[Flight-related cost effect of the Price-Recovery Component (i.e., higher costs due to higher 
flight-related costs per ASM)]
Variance = {Year j passenger load factor} * {Year j actual ASMs} * {Year i cost/ASM – Year j 
cost/ASM}
4.  Passenger-related Costs
[Passenger-related cost effect of the Price-Recovery Component (i.e., higher costs due to 
higher costs per passenger)]
Variance = {Year j budgeted revenue passengers} * {Year i cost/passenger – Year j cost/
passenger}
133
JTRF Volume 50 No. 3, Fall 2011
The Productivity Component
1. Fuel Costs (a)
[Fuel cost effect of the Productivity Component (i.e., lower costs due to lower fuel usage per 
gallon)]
Variance = {Year j fuel cost/gallon} * {Year j budgeted ASMs} * {Year i gallons used /ASM – 
Year j gallons used/ASM}
2.  Fuel Costs (b)
[Fuel (ASM) cost effect of the Productivity Component (i.e., lower costs due to higher 
passenger load factor)]
Variance = {Year j fuel cost/gallon} * {Year j gallons used/ASM} * {Year j budgeted ASMs – 
Year j actual ASMs}
3.  Passenger-related costs
[Passenger-related cost effect of the Productivity Component (i.e., lower costs due to higher 
miles per passenger)]
Variance = {Year j cost/passenger} * {Year j budgeted revenue passengers – Year j revenue 
passengers}
The Capacity Underutilization Component
1.  Flight-related costs (a)
[Changes in flight-related costs relating to unused capacities (i.e., higher unit costs to 
acquire capacity that is unused)]
Variance = {Year j actual ASMs – Year j RPMs} * {Year i cost/ASM – Year j cost/ASM}
2.  Flight-related costs (b)
[Changes in flight-related costs of available capacities (i.e., lower underutilization due to 
decrease in available capacity)]
Variance = {Year i cost/ASM} * {Year i actual ASMs – Year j actual ASMs}
3.  Flight-related costs (c)
[Changes in flight-related costs of used capacities (i.e., higher underutilization due to 
decrease in capacity used)]
Variance = {Year i cost/ASM} * {Year j RPMs – Year i RPMs}
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Endnotes
1. It wasn’t possible to have data for a year later than 2009 since the study would have lost 
Northwest Airlines, which by 2010 had been fully assimilated into Delta Airlines. Full and 
separate non-consolidated data were available for Northwest through 2009. However, this was 
not the case for US Airways as unconsolidated data were available only through 2007, after 
which US Airways and America West data are both consolidated.
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